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Abstract
Europe is close to implementing its ﬁrst geological repositories for spent nuclear fuel. The European Commission has endorsed 
geological disposal as the favoured strategy for dealing with Europe’s long-lived radioactive wastes, pointing out that it is tech-
nically feasible now, and that can demonstrate the required guarantees of long-term isolation. This article reviews the origins and 
the scientiﬁc and technical basis of the concept of geological disposal, looking in particular at how isolation and containment are 
provided and the timescales over which containment is needed. It goes on to look at the status of geological disposal internationally 
and at some trends and issues which both implementers and regulators are addressing.
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Resumen
Europa está a punto de poner en práctica sus primeros almacenamientos geológicos para el combustible nuclear gastado. La Co-
misión Europea ha respaldado el almacenamiento geológico como la mejor estrategia para hacer frente a los residuos radiactivos de 
larga vida. El almacenamiento geológico  es técnicamente factible actualmente, y se pueden demostrar las garantías requeridas de 
aislamiento a largo plazo. El artículo revisa los orígenes y los fundamentos cientíﬁcos y técnicos del concepto de almacenamiento 
geológico describiendo en particular los métodos utilizados para  proporcionar el aislamiento y la contención en las escalas de tiem-
po en las que la contención es necesaria. Asimismo revisa la situación del almacenamiento geológico a nivel internacional y algunas 
de las tendencias y cuestiones que ejecutores y reguladores están planteando.
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1. Introduction
The objective of this short paper is to provide an over-
view of deep geological disposal – what it is, why we 
need it and which important issues are being addressed 
today by waste management agencies, regulators and de-
cision makers. It is timely to look at these topics because 
almost 50 years has passed since the concept was ﬁrst 
seriously considered and Europe is now almost of a sin-
gle mind as to the need for such facilities if we are to 
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formations at depths of several hundreds of metres. Af-
ter some decades of operation, such repositories can be 
closed and sealed, at the convenience of future decision-
makers. Few countries use geological disposal for non-
radioactive hazardous wastes. However, the increasingly 
stringent environmental controls that have developed in 
many countries over the last 30 years, combined with 
the inexorable increase in waste arisings from industrial 
countries and the wiser use of the land surface are likely 
to see more interest placed in the wider use of geological 
disposal in the future. 
Despite their small volume, the whole concept of care-
fully designed geological disposal using the ‘multibarrier’ 
system1 of containment has been developed speciﬁcally 
for these wastes, with the earliest work dating back to 
the late 1950s in the USA. Geological disposal at a depth 
of some hundreds of metres in a carefully engineered 
repository was ﬁrst formally advanced as an appropri-
ate, safe solution to radioactive management almost ﬁfty 
years ago, in the United States (NAS, 1957). However, 
progress has been slow and the timescales of geological 
repository development programmes are unusually long, 
compared with any other industrial or engineering enter-
prises – typically several decades, even some hundreds 
of years. The WIPP repository for military transuranic 
wastes (New Mexico, USA) was the ﬁrst purpose built 
geological repository to be successfully licensed and be-
gan operating ﬁve years ago. Slow implementation for 
commercial wastes is largely a matter of failure to obtain 
political and public acceptance of technical proposals, the 
way in which they have been advanced and the way in 
which people have been involved in the process. Nev-
ertheless, the last few years have seen an acceleration in 
activity in several countries and it is now likely that Fin-
land, Sweden and possibly the USA will have operational 
spent fuel repositories within the next ten years.
continue with nuclear power – indeed, the ﬁrst national 
repository is under construction, in Finland. 
Each of the larger European countries produces several 
hundred million tonnes of waste every year. Although 
care is obviously required in managing all of this material, 
only a fraction, typically around 1%, is considered to be 
signiﬁcantly hazardous and an even smaller fraction, per-
haps around 0.1%, is regarded as extremely toxic. About 
60% of hazardous waste produced in Europe comes from 
manufacturing industry, with the chemical industry being 
the main single producer. Some of these hazardous wastes 
cannot be treated to make them safe and can only be man-
aged by disposing of them safely, which generally means 
by burial in the ground. At present, only a tiny fraction 
of wastes worldwide is disposed of by deep burial: much 
hazardous waste is still buried in shallow landﬁlls.
The more advanced countries have embarked on ma-
jor programmes to reduce the amount of waste they have 
to dispose of. Clearly, development of clean processes 
can completely prevent the production of some wastes. 
Schemes that minimize waste production at source are 
followed by recycling programmes to deal with as much 
of the inevitable waste products as possible. Wastes that 
have no use can be treated, by incineration for example, 
to destroy hazardous substances or reduce their volume. 
However, there is always some residue that requires dis-
posal (Fig. 1). 
The European Union generates about 35% of its elec-
tricity from nuclear energy, although this has historical-
ly only produced about 0.05% by volume of its power 
production wastes (European Commission, 2004a). The 
nuclear industry shares the same approach to preven-
tion and minimisation of wastes as that described above. 
Some countries also recycle (reprocessing spent fuel), 
but all nuclear industry processes (and several from other 
industries and activities) produce a certain amount of ra-
dioactive waste that has to be managed. Unlike hazard-
ous wastes from other sources, the most toxic radioactive 
wastes are destined for deep geological disposal – burial 
in carefully engineered facilities located in stable rock 
1 where the waste containers, the engineered components of the re-
pository and the surrounding geological environment work in concert 
to contain radionuclides
Fig. 1.- The concept of progressive reduction in waste volumes, arising from any industrial process, if modern management 
concepts are utilised.
Fig. 1.- Concepto de reducción progresiva del volumen de residuos, aplicable a cualquier proceso industrial, si se utilizan 
los conceptos modernos de gestión.
JIG32-1.indb   8 12/01/2006   19:56:55
9N. Chapman / Journal of Iberian Geology 32 (1) 2006: 7-14
One aspect of radioactive waste disposal that sets it 
aside from the management of other types of waste is 
the inclusion of long periods of interim storage prior to 
disposal. This is partly an inevitable consequence of the 
slow progress in building repositories, but it is also in-
creasingly proposed as a response to public demands to 
proceed cautiously with disposal, in a ‘staged’ approach 
(NRC, 2003) that allows plenty of time for decisions to 
be made and permits retrieval of wastes if required. 
2. The aim of deep geological disposal
Deep geological disposal is typically a management 
option retained for high level wastes (vitriﬁed HLW from 
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, or the spent nuclear fuel 
itself if it is not to be reprocessed) and the longer-lived in-
termediate level wastes (ILW), either of which categories 
has a signiﬁcant content of radionuclides with half-lives 
of tens of thousands of years or longer (Table 1). 
Historically, there have been two approaches to dispos-
ing of hazardous wastes: ‘concentrate and contain’ and 
‘dilute and disperse’. The latter is often taken to imply 
uncontrolled releases of toxic substances into the envi-
ronment and is now generally frowned upon, even though 
it may be the most reasonable and best practicable option 
for small quantities of some substances. Concentrating 
radioactive wastes into one location means that they can 
be contained more easily and many radionuclides can be 
conﬁdently left to decay in situ to harmless levels without 
any concern that normal natural processes will mobilise 
them into the environment. Geological disposal is a clear 
example of this approach: concentrate, contain and iso-
late hazardous material in a location that is well out of 
harm’s way. It can be done, with reasonable expenditure 
of resources, in such a way as to have zero effect on the 
biosphere for many thousands of years. Achieving zero 
impact, even for a few hundred years, is already a major 
advance on any other management option and on what 
society achieves for any other persistent hazardous mate-
rials. It also seems to match society’s expectation of who 
they want to protect and for how long.
However, concentrate and contain does mean that 
wastes in a geological repository could be vulnerable to 
intrusion by people in the future. Also, some radionu-
clides have such long half lives (Table 1) that they will re-
main in the repository until natural geological processes 
expose them or mobilise them. At this point, ‘concentrate 
and contain’ reverts to ‘dilute and disperse’, as these re-
sidual radionuclides are dispersed into the surrounding 
rocks and waters in low concentrations to join the natu-
rally occurring radionuclides already present. 
The overall objective of deep disposal is thus to isolate 
the wastes from the biosphere until such time as natural 
processes of decay and dilution prevent any radionuclide 
from returning in concentrations sufﬁcient to pose an un-
acceptable hazard. Clearly, many processes, such as mo-
bilisation, transport, retardation, retention, dilution and 
re-concentration need to be accounted for in evaluating 
whether this aim can be met, for a range of possible sce-
narios of future evolution of the disposal system. In the 
multibarrier approach, the individual engineered barriers 
around the solid waste act together to provide a variety 
of ‘safety functions’ which control the inevitable releases 
of radioactivity from the repository and their movement 
through the rock. 
3. Containment periods 
A fundamental issue in geological disposal is the pe-
riod over which we expect to contain the wastes, as they 
clearly cannot be isolated for ever from the inexorable 
processes of geological and environmental change. A 
Table 1.- Some important radionuclides in long-lived wastes
Tabla 1.- Algunos radionucleidos importantes en residuos de larga 
vida.
Radionuclide
Approximate half-
life (years)
Fission and Activation Products
Carbon-14 (14C)
Chlorine-36 (36Cl)
Nickel-59 (59Ni)
Selenium-79 (79Se)
Niobium-94 (94Nb)
Technetium-99 (99Tc)
Tin-126 (126Sn)
Iodine-129 (129I)
Caesium-135 (135Cs)
5700
300,000
75,000
65,000
20,000
210,000
100,000
16,000,000
2,300,000
Transuranic actinide and natural 
U-Th decay chain radionuclides
Radium-226 (226Ra)
Thorium-230 (230Th)
Thorium-232 (232Th)
Protactinium 231 (231Pa)
Uranium-234 (234U)
Uranium-235 (235U)
Uranium-238 (238U)
Neptunium-237 (237Np)
Plutonium-239 (239Pu)
Americium-241 (241Am)
1600
77,000
14,000,000,000
33,000
240,000
700,000,000
4,500,000,000
2,100,000
24,000
430
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properly implemented repository can contain long-lived 
wastes such as spent fuel and HLW until they have de-
cayed to levels of hazard commensurate with natural ura-
nium ore deposits: a few thousand to a few hundred thou-
sand years. Clearly, protection needs to be matched to the 
changing hazard that the waste represents as radioactive 
decay progresses. 
The greatest hazard with HLW and spent fuel wastes 
destined for geological disposal is associated with the 
early time period – the ﬁrst few hundred years. Here, 
when there is the potential for major impacts if people 
were to be exposed to the wastes, the design process aims 
to provide a containment system that gives maximum 
protection, and the need for compliance with radiologi-
cal protection regulations should be at its most stringent. 
After this high hazard period, containment requirements 
need not be any more demanding and, in fact, become 
less rigorous with increasing time. At some point in time, 
containment can be argued to become unnecessary (and, 
at some later time, unachievable). When does the impor-
tance of the containment system decline to the former 
point? 
Figure 2 shows the progressive reduction in radioactiv-
ity of spent fuel compared to that of an equivalent amount 
of natural uranium ore used to manufacture the fuel. A 
plot of radiotoxicity decline with time would show simi-
lar form and a similar cross-over time. The key message 
is that there is a ‘back-to-nature cross-over’ point when 
the hazard of a spent fuel repository becomes similar to 
that of natural systems, albeit not necessarily systems 
found in similar environments or regions of the planned 
repositories. Spent fuel radiotoxicity ‘cross-over’ occurs 
after one to a few hundred thousand years, whilst that for 
HLW occurs much earlier – after only a few thousand 
years. These could provide benchmarks in time for the 
provision of protection, beyond which the containment 
objectives change.
Beyond this natural ‘cross-over’ time there is a strong 
case, based on the parallel with nature, on society’s real 
expectations and on sensible use of resources, for saying 
that we have done enough. There is no logical or ethi-
cal reason for trying to provide more protection than the 
population already has from Earth’s natural radiation en-
vironment, in which it lives and evolves. It is a scientiﬁ-
cally tenuous position to argue that additional protection 
(e.g. down to a few microsieverts of exposure) can be 
provided so far into the future and unreasonable to expect 
it, or to regulate for it.
But what about the period before this cross-over point? 
Here, the repository system must function to provide pro-
tection that can be judged by estimating the radiological 
impacts of any releases and comparing them with regula-
tory requirements, based on radiological doses and com-
mensurate risks. Dose and risk limits are often laid down 
in national environmental regulations, which themselves 
are based on internationally recognised radiological stand-
ards. For example, regulations may stipulate target levels 
of radiation dose (or consequent risk of serious health ef-
fects) to hypothetical individual members of the public. 
A repository developer would be expected to show that 
any potential doses or risks fell below such target levels, 
for all reasonable circumstances, and for at least several 
thousands of years into the future – much longer in some 
countries. Here, it must be acknowledged that the con-
cept outlined above, of their being some back-to-nature 
state, is still being discussed, and many regulations re-
quire compliance with the same dose or risk target for all 
times. At present, the USA, after having been a notable 
exception for many years, with an effective cut-off time of 
10,000 years for the main safety case arguments, is now 
considering a long-term standard that is directly related 
to natural background radioactivity. The US Environmen-
tal Protection Agency is proposing a 3.5 mSv/a standard 
for the period between 10,000 and 1 million years that is 
equivalent to average natural background radiation expo-
sures in some parts of the USA. Much of the background 
to the development and use of safety principles for radio-
active waste management is described by Chapman and 
McCombie (2003).
4. Providing containment  
Containment in the intermediate period between the to-
tal containment of around a thousand years and the ‘return 
to nature’ state of a few hundred thousand years is thus 
what primarily concerns the designer when establishing a 
particular repository safety concept. Contrary to popular 
misconceptions, the greatest challenge is not containing 
elements such as plutonium, since these are extremely 
immobile in most geological environments. The princi-
pal issue is to show that the multibarrier system will limit 
releases of mobile radionuclides, such as those of iodine 
and chlorine. Once water has contacted the waste, it is not 
possible to exclude the release of some of these radionu-
clides into the geosphere and, eventually to the biosphere. 
Safety over the long-term is predicated on these releases 
to the biosphere being of no consequence because they 
are very slow and at very low concentrations, controlled 
by dispersion, retardation and dilution in the rocks and 
groundwaters of the natural barrier.
A wide range of host geological formations has been 
considered worldwide for deep repositories, including 
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hard crystalline rocks (such as granite, gneiss and volcan-
ic tuff), argillaceous rocks (clays, mudrocks, shales) and 
evaporate formations (dome and bedded salts). In most 
disposal concepts being considered internationally, the 
host geological formations (although selected for their 
low permeability) are still sufﬁciently permeable that 
some groundwater movement can occur. The releases 
are then controlled by the rate and volume of ﬂow of the 
groundwater. In some geological environments, (clays 
and claystones) ﬂow may be so limited that extremely 
slow solute diffusion is the dominant process by which 
radionuclides can migrate. A special case is presented by 
repository concepts involving emplacement in salt depos-
its. In a normal evolution scenario, no groundwater will 
contact the waste packages and the predicted releases 
will be zero at all times considered. In addition, so called 
‘high isolation’ environments can be found in ﬂat, arid, 
tectonically stable regions of the world where there are 
effectively no driving forces for deep groundwater move-
ment. The prime focus of safety assessments for salts, 
clays and ‘high isolation’ environments may then be on 
disruptive processes or events which can disturb the natu-
ral barrier. 
The key features of a favourable disposal environment 
(in terms of its geological, hydrogeological and geo-
chemical attributes) can be summarised as (not in order 
of importance):
• tectonic stability over long periods of time, or where 
the deep environment is not signiﬁcantly affected by lo-
cal tectonic processes and events;
• very low groundwater ﬂuxes at depth and preferably 
where there is minimal coupling between ﬂows in the up-
per parts of the rock mass and those at greater depth;
• very old, stable and reducing groundwater at depth;
Fig. 2.- Relative radioactivity of typical spent fuel as a function of time after discharge from the reactor, showing the early, dominant con-
tribution of the ﬁssion and activation products. After a few hundred years, the actinide elements become dominant. After a few hundred 
thousand years, the total activity of the fuel is similar to that of the uranium ore from which the fuel was produced (redrawn, after 
Hedin, 1997).
Fig. 2.- Actividad relativa del combustible gastado en función del tiempo desde la licencia del reactor. Inicialmente, se observa la contribu-
ción dominante de los productos de ﬁsión y activación. Después de unos cientos de años, los actínidos se hacen dominantes. Después de 
unos cientos de miles de años, la actividad total del combustible gastado es similar a la del depósito de uranio a partir del que se produjo el 
combustible (redibujado de Hedin, 1997) 
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• resilience (at depth) to the effects of climate change 
–  in particular, the groundwater system needs to be suit-
ably buffered against such changes; 
• thermal stability of the rock–water system;
• rock mass with geotechnical properties that allow for 
repository construction;
• lack of fast transport pathways from the repository to 
the surface;
• a preference for diffusion-dominated radionuclide 
movement (i.e. essentially static groundwater conditions), 
rather than advection in slowly moving groundwater;
• ability to disperse any gas generated within the re-
pository (e.g. by anaerobic corrosion of metals).
A carefully chosen geological environment has the po-
tential to act as a cocoon for the repository engineered bar-
rier system (EBS), protecting it from gross ﬂuctuations in 
stress, water ﬂow and hydrochemistry. Large ﬂuctuations 
in these properties are generally experienced in dynamic 
regions of Earth’s crust, such as near-surface rock and 
groundwater systems that are more easily and rapidly af-
fected by changes in climate and in land use. The deeper 
environment is sheltered from these effects, with increas-
ing depth buffering against and smoothing out in time the 
magnitude of surface perturbations. This isolation from 
surface effects is an extremely important function of the 
natural barrier system in the majority of safety concepts, 
as it enables that part of the disposal system that can ac-
tually be designed and optimised (i.e. the EBS) to func-
tion predictably for long periods of time. The end result 
in terms of containment within the multibarrier system 
is that many radionuclides decay in situ. Only the most 
mobile and longest lived radionuclides migrate out into 
the rock around the repository. A tiny fraction of these re-
turns to the biosphere, in very low concentrations, owing 
to physical and chemical processes of retention, dilution 
and dispersion.
5. Illustrating safety
Putting all the technical aspects of repository design 
and performance together is often done via an integrated 
safety assessment, involving modelling the processes 
that affect the way a repository evolves over long time 
periods into the future. Over the last thirty years, numer-
ous safety assessment have been carried out to evalu-
ate how containment will be provided (often called the 
‘safety concept’ for a design) and whether speciﬁc de-
signs and, more recently, detailed, site speciﬁc repository 
systems can achieve regulatory safety targets. Calculated 
radiological impacts of repositories under normal future 
evolution scenarios (including those involving environ-
mental changes) are generally orders of magnitude below 
impacts from natural background radiation and, by any 
normal standards of human judgement of risk acceptabil-
ity, are effectively zero. 
However, providing conﬁdence in these modelling 
studies has not always been easy and some people re-
main sceptical of the results, which is why they are often 
described as estimates or as being illustrative of perform-
ance (rather than predictions of actual behaviour, which 
they cannot be owing to uncertainties about the far future). 
One of the best means of providing conﬁdence that a sys-
tem will behave as it is designed is by analogy. The use 
of natural and archaeological analogues of materials and 
processes that occur in repositories (Miller et al., 2001) 
has proved a tremendously powerful means of illustrating 
that we understand repository evolution and can scope 
radiological impacts conﬁdently. Examples of natural 
analogues are to be found, for example, in uranium ore 
deposits, where processes of migration and retention of 
natural radionuclides that have been active over millions 
of years can be examined. 
6. Status and trends in geological disposal
Geological disposal is now the accepted solution for 
long-lived and highly active radioactive wastes in every 
country that has a ﬁnal management solution. Only coun-
tries that are undecided at a political level on the overall 
waste management programme have yet to make the de-
cision. In Europe, at the end of its most recent ﬁve-year 
programme (whose extensive results are summarised 
in European Commission, 2004a) the European Com-
mission declared (European Commission, 2004b) that: 
“Disposal in deep (>300 metre) geological repositories, 
the favoured strategy in Europe for long-lived high-level 
radioactive waste, is now possible”. In the same docu-
ment, the Commission also states that: “Deep geological 
disposal is technically feasible now and can demonstrate 
the guarantees of long-term isolation and protection the 
public demands”.
Following decades of research and development it has 
become the preferred option for the eventual disposal of 
solid, high level and long-lived intermediate level wastes 
in almost every country with a nuclear power programme. 
Whilst the timescales and routes to eventual disposal vary 
from country to country – with different approaches to 
interim storage, for example – emplacement in a geologi-
cal repository is the anticipated end-point. This prefer-
ence is generally expressed in national policy documents 
or laws. The IAEA Joint Convention on Spent Fuel and 
Radioactive Wastes (IAEA, 1997) also obliges all signa-
tory states to submit regular, detailed overviews of their 
national waste management programmes. The European 
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Commission is also set on establishing binding legisla-
tion that would require each Member State of the Euro-
pean Union to declare a proper schedule for disposal of 
its nuclear power wastes.
After decades of research, a key technical trend today 
is a move of emphasis from supporting scientiﬁc research 
towards practical considerations – after all, several coun-
tries are on the verge of constructing repositories. Whilst 
a number of scientiﬁc issues would beneﬁt from further 
study, and whilst scientiﬁc knowledge and understanding 
will continue to grow, evolve and contribute to conﬁdence 
in geological disposal, the real technical issues today are 
with practical implementability. For example, the major 
programmes will have to move from largely conceptual 
engineering designs for the EBS to much more practical 
designs that consider how to emplace and manage large 
items and active materials in the underground environ-
ment. Work in underground laboratories such as Grimsel 
and Mont Terri in Switzerland, Äspö in Sweden and Mol 
in Belgium are all now addressing these practicalities by 
mounting full-scale engineering demonstrations of EBS 
emplacement.
The requirements on a deep geological repository are, 
however, not just the technical issues discussed earlier 
in this paper, which is perhaps the main reason why 
progress has been slow over the last decades, as not all 
these requirements were recognised from the outset and 
many national programmes have been slow to respond to 
some of them. Requirements over and above straightfor-
ward technical feasibility and demonstration of safety to 
regulatory standards include:
• Ethics: Can geological repositories be implemented 
without being “unfair” to present day stakeholders or to 
future generations, who should also not be subjected to 
unnecessary burdens?
• Security: Do repositories provide sufﬁcient protec-
tion against deliberate misuse of the hazardous materials 
they contain?
• Environmental Acceptability: How can a repository 
be constructed and operated without undue disturbance 
of the environment? How will the local community be 
affected
• Public acceptability: What are the public views on 
waste repositories? How can the public best be included 
in the decision making processes? Can a sufﬁcient degree 
of societal consensus be achieved?
• Economic viability: How much do repositories cost? 
Does geological disposal make the nuclear fuel cycle un-
economic?
Much work has been carried out in each of these areas 
over recent years. Perhaps the main problem has been 
meeting the requirement of public acceptability. Attain-
ing a sufﬁcient level of public acceptability and of so-
cietal consensus has been one of the major factors that 
have prevented implementation of geological reposi-
tories. In all countries with geological repository pro-
grammes there has been some degree of public lack of 
acceptance or even direct opposition. The shortcomings 
of past industry policies of public involvement have been 
recognized today and several international initiatives are 
underway to try to improve the situation (e.g. COWAM, 
2003; RISCOM, 2003). One approach to providing in-
creased opportunities for interactions between nuclear 
experts and the interested public is to adopt a phased 
or staged procedure for implementing major projects. 
Staging involves repeated consultation of a wide range 
of stakeholders, including the public. No major decision 
should be taken without ensuring that there is sufﬁcient 
acceptance of the choice made. The characterising fea-
ture of every national programme over the last 30 years 
has been how well it identiﬁes and manages critical deci-
sion points that must be navigated. There are numerous 
decision points in a ‘staged’ process (NRC, 2003) and an 
important consideration for every programme is how the 
decisions are made and who is involved. Some decisions 
might be seen as entirely internal technical matters (e.g. 
container material), some decisions seem to be entirely 
external and outside the control of programme managers 
(e.g. political approvals, licensing), but every decision 
could involve a range of stakeholders and could be ap-
proached in different ways. 
The European Commission, having stated a ﬁrm EU 
preference for geological disposal of its long-lived radio-
active wastes, is promoting legislation that would require 
all European Union member states and future member 
states to establish speciﬁc deadlines for siting repositor-
ies and for implementing these facilities. Many smaller 
European Union countries, or larger countries with small 
amounts of waste, or with no national solutions in place, 
need to face the problem that deep geological repositor-
ies are expensive facilities. These nations also need safe 
and secure long-term waste management options. For 
this reason, there is increasing interest in the concept 
of shared deep geological repositories in Europe, with a 
number of countries agreeing to cooperate in implement-
ing a regional facility (see the results of the ﬁrst Euro-
pean study of regional repository feasibility: SAPIERR, 
2005).
In coming years, there will be signiﬁcant policy deci-
sions taken in several European countries with respect 
to deep geological disposal. In 2006, France must refor-
mulate its policy concerning the weighting on the three 
different long-term management options currently being 
studied (long-term surface or underground storage, trans-
JIG32-1.indb   13 12/01/2006   19:56:58
14 N. Chapman / Journal of Iberian Geology 32 (1) 2006: 7-14
mutation, and geological disposal). After a long period of 
consultation and reﬂection following earlier programme 
failures, the United Kingdom is expected to decide on an 
option for management of its large legacy of radioactive 
wastes. This is seen as especially important today, when 
the UK’s future energy policy needs to be decided, with 
the role of nuclear power being central to this decision. 
Implementation of deep geological repositories is not, 
however an urgent task. The target deadlines set for open-
ing and operating deep geological repositories in many 
countries are decades into the future – but it is essential to 
have a programme that will eventually achieve this objec-
tive. The desire to see proper solutions for historic wastes 
from nuclear power and to have solutions for wastes from 
Europe’s essential new, future nuclear programmes, to-
gether with the need to have secure systems for isolat-
ing radioactive materials from potential terrorist activity 
means that simply watching and waiting is no longer an 
acceptable response from political decision makers.
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